St. John's Law Review
Volume 41, January 1967, Number 3

Article 16

CPLR 213(2): Amendment
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 41

of another provision (CPLR 204, subd. [a]) just the opposite
intention and meaning."15
The present case should be contrasted with the prior case of
Creswell v. Doe.'
Creswell involved Section 618(a) of the
Insurance Law. This section requires qualified persons to obtain
leave from the supreme court to sue MVAIC on a hit-and-run
automobile case. The appellate division held that the statute of
limitations was tolled from the date of the accident until the date
when leave to sue was granted. By distinguishing Proc from
Creswell, it appears that the Court of Appeals has relied on the
clear legislative pronouncements in the area of standard fire insurance policies. It seems unlikely that similar preclusions of CPLR
204(a) will come about absent comparable legislative histories.
CPLR 206(a): Amendment.
CPLR 206(a) has been amended to include: "Except as provided in article 3 of the uniform commercial code."
Section
3-122(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code states that a cause
of action against a drawer of a draft or an indorser of any instrument accrues upon a demand following dishonor. Typically, such
demand takes the form of a notice of dishonor after the instrument
has been presented to and dishonored by the person designated
on the instrument to pay. Under the prior 206(a) provision, the
cause of action was computed from dishonor, not from demand.
CPLR 213(2): Amendment.
CPLR 213(2) has been amended to read that there will be a
six-year statute of limitations in any action upon a contractual
obligation or liability "except as provided in article 2 of the
uniform commercial code." Section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a four-year statute of limitations for
breach of a sales contract.
The amendment effects no change. CPLR 213(2) now expressly defers to the Uniform Commercial Code's four-year period
for sales contract cases. Before the amendment it also deferred,
but under the more general terms of CPLR 101. After the
Uniform Commercial Code is four years old, which will be on
September 27, 1968, the courts can expect a substantial number
of cases in which they will be asked to determine whether the
contract involved is a sales contract within the meaning of the
15 Proc v. Home Ins. Co., 17 N.Y2d 239, 245, 217 N.E.2d 136, 139,
270 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415 (1966).
The
1622 App. Div. 2d 942, 255 N.Y.S.2d 946 (2d Dep't 1964).
appellate division, however, did not look at the legislative history behind
the wrongful death statute in rendering its decision.
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UCC. If it is, it will have a four-year period; if it is not, it will
have the six-year period provided by the CPLR.
ARTICLE 3-JtURISDICTION AN) SERvIcE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a): Amendment.
The revisers of the CPLR have amended section 302(a) to
include a new subsection (3), which provides that the New York
courts will have in personam jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
defendant who
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state... if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantidl revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences
in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce. [Emphasis added.]

Prior to the enactment of CPLR 302, a liberal trend was
noticeable among those United States Supreme Court decisions
which concerned the constitutionality of "long-arm" statutes.17 The
requirement of physical presence within a state gave way to the
notion that a non-domiciliary who committed certain acts within
the state would be subject to in personam jurisdiction if the
imposition of jurisdiction did not offend "our traditional conception
of fair play and substantial justice... .'
In International Shoe
9
Co. v. Washington,"
this was interpreted to mean that due process

required a defendant to have certain "minimum contacts" before
a state could exercise in personam jurisdiction.
In 1965, the New York Court of Appeals had the opportunity,
for the first time, to interpret its own "long-arn" statute. Before
it, as a guide, was the liberal decision of the Supreme Court of
20
Illinois in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.
In that case, an Ohio manufacturer was said to come within the
purview of the Illinois "tortious act" jurisdictional statute when
a valve he had manufactured in Ohio caused injury in Illinois.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that there could be no distinction
between the negligent act of manufacturing and the consequences

17

See Hanson v. Dendda, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International

Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
IsInternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
19 Supra.note 17.
2022 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).

